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The current notions of bounded rationality in economics share distinctive features with Simon’s 
original notion of bounded rationality, which still influences the theoretical and experimental research 
in the fields of choice, judgment, decision making, problem solving, and social cognition. All these 
notions of bounded rationality are in fact equally rooted in the information-processing approach to 
human cognition, expressing the view that reasoning is disembodied and that it can be reduced to the 
processing of abstract symbolic representations of the environment. This is in contrast with the last 
three-decade advancements in cognitive psychology, where a new view on human cognition has 
emerged under the general label of ‘embodied cognition’, demonstrating that cognition and reasoning 
are grounded in the morphological traits of the human body and the sensory-motor system. In this 
paper we argue that embodied cognition might reform the current notions of bounded rationality and 
we propose a number of arguments devoted to outline a novel program of research under the label of 
‘embodied rationality’: (1) reasoning is situated as it arises from the ongoing interaction between the 
subject and the environment; (2) reasoning, not being exclusively a mental phenomenon, 
constitutively relies on the physical resources provided by the environment; (3) the sensory-motor 
system provides the building blocks for abstract reasoning, (4) automatic thinking is rooted in the 
evolutionary coupling between the morphological traits of the human body and the environment. 
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The world and reason are not problematical 
M. Merleau-Ponty 
 
1. Introduction3 
 
In 1976, the still-to-become Nobel laureate in economics and cognitive psychologist Herbert A. 
Simon wrote these important words: “a person unfamiliar with the histories and contemporary 
research preoccupations of these two disciplines [economics and cognitive psychology] might 
imagine that there were close relations between them – a constant flow of theoretical and empirical 
findings from the one to the other and back. In actual fact communication has been quite infrequent 
[entailing a] state of mutual ignorance” (Simon 1976, p. 65). It is with a certain embarrassment that 
after 40 years, notwithstanding a remarkable lip service to the necessity of integrating psychology 
into economics, and some not negligible effort in that direction, these words have still a quantum of 
truth. 
Scientific exchange between economics and psychology – or, better, between economic psychology4 
and cognitive psychology – still occurs today in a fragmentary, instrumental and fundamentally time-
lagged way, mostly inattentive to the current foundational debates on how human cognition works 
(see, e.g., Rabin 1998). Among economic psychologists, there seems to be no real acknowledgment 
that in the last 30 years cognitive psychology has been undergoing a true paradigm shift, hinging 
upon the hypothesis of the constitutive dependence of human cognition from the morphological traits 
of the human body and its sensory-motor system. A huge amount of theoretical and empirical research 
has supported this new hypothesis (without any pretension to be exhaustive, among the major works 
are Varela et al. 1991; Clark 1997; Clancey 1997; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Rowlands 1999; Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999; Wilson 2002; Shapiro 2004; Noë 2004; Gallagher 2005; Pfeifer and Bongard 
2006; Barrett 2011)5. This rich corpus of research is today identified through the label embodied 
                                                          
3 This contribution is a modified version of an essay published in Italian in the journal Sistemi Intelligenti (Mastrogiorgio 
and Petracca 2015). We would like to thank Professor Lorenzo Magnani for the invaluable encouragement and support. 
A particularly grateful thought goes to the memory of Werner Callebaut, who first supported us on the way to embodied 
rationality. 
4 With the term ‘economic psychology’ we mean that domain of inquiry oriented to study phenomena such as choice, 
judgment, decision making, problem solving and social cognition. In this broad definition we include also the so-called 
behavioral economics. However, we remark that there is a significant disciplinary divide between ‘psychological’ and 
‘economic’ approaches to the topics above, characterized for instance by different experimental practices (Hertwig and 
Ortmann 2001). 
5 Research in AI also supported this point of view on cognition (see, e.g., Brooks 1990). 
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cognition, which encompasses slightly different approaches such as embodied (strictly speaking) 
cognition, distributed cognition, situated cognition, embedded cognition and enacted cognition6. 
In this essay we argue that the theoretical and empirical relationship between economic psychology 
and cognitive psychology deserves to move beyond an instrumental and time-lagged approach. If this 
relationship has to be established, as we argue, at the foundational level, it has to unavoidably take 
into consideration the implications of embodied cognition for economic psychology. The notion that 
has historically constituted the privileged interface for exchanges between economics and psychology 
is the notion of economic rationality. Thus, rationality shall be our focus domain in order to inquire 
into a new foundational debate in economic psychology. In particular, within rationality studies in 
economics, our focus will be on the notion of bounded rationality. This choice is founded on specific 
and fundamental reasons. First, Herbert A. Simon, who first introduced the notion of bounded 
rationality in economics, was both an economist and a cognitive psychologist, founding father of the 
approach to cognitive psychology called cognitivism, object of serious critiques from embodied 
cognition. Furthermore, far from being a piece of archaeology, bounded rationality still constitutes 
the bulk of the most important developments in economic rationality. The recent notions of economic 
rationality stem from, as we shall see, Simon’s original notion of bounded rationality, which still 
influences, both directly and indirectly, knowingly and more often than not unknowingly, all the 
theoretical and experimental productions in the fields of choice, judgment, decision making, problem 
solving, and social cognition in economics. 
To the objective of setting the ground for a new foundational dialogue between economic psychology 
and cognitive psychology this essay is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a panorama of the main 
contemporary threads of inquiry into economic rationality, particularly emphasizing their Simonian 
roots. Section 3 is devoted to review the main (and various) conceptual points of embodied cognition, 
assessing their potential importance for economic rationality. In this essay, we use the label embodied 
rationality to convey the view of economic rationality as reformed in the light of embodied cognition.  
 
 
2. State of art in economic rationality 
 
The notion of rationality in economics has gone through a quite stylized historical development, 
originating from the concept of ‘classical’ rationality seen as the individual’s ability to make 
optimizing choices (i.e., choices that maximize a function of interest, typically what is called ‘utility’, 
                                                          
6 For a panorama on these different labels and their theoretical interconnections see Goldman and de Vignemont (2009), 
Kiverstein and Clark (2009), Fischer (2012).  
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given the satisfaction of consistency criteria in individual preferences) subject to exogenous 
constraints (see Blume and Easley 2008). Against this background, Simon introduced the notion of 
bounded rationality as a radical conceptual shift, meant to provide an altogether new framework for 
economic rationality (Callebaut 2007). By using the well-known metaphor of ‘scissors’ is probably 
the most suitable way to convey the nucleus of novelty of bounded rationality. As Allen Newell and 
Simon himself claimed (Newell and Simon 1972, p. 55): “[j]ust as a scissors cannot cut a paper 
without two blades a theory of thinking and problem solving [i.e., a theory of rationality] cannot 
predict behavior unless it encompasses both an analysis of the structure of task and an analysis of the 
limits of rational adaptation to task environment”. According to this definition, the psychology of the 
individual on the one hand, and the environment in which the individual is embedded on the other 
hand, represent two necessary theoretical requirements – two blades of scissors – to develop a theory 
of rationality. In this way, continuing with the metaphor, the scissors “have cutting power […] only 
when both blades operate” (Bendor as quoted in Callebaut 2007, p. 78), that is to say, the two cores 
of rationality must be studied in conjunction.  Alternatively, one can say that individuals and 
environments represent a single analytical unit. 
This notion of bounded rationality has typically suffered from distorted, mostly diminutive and 
instrumental interpretations, forcing Simon himself, from time to time over the decades, to reaffirm 
the true revolutionary intentions behind the notion. In particular, the greatest misunderstanding over 
bounded rationality is related, as Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) point out, to a partial view of the 
scissors argument; indeed, many economists have equated, mistakenly, bounded rationality with the 
view of humans as ‘limited’ information processors. In this view, bounded rationality is reduced to 
just one blade of Simon’s scissors. The lack of environment as key variable in the rationality 
framework has entirely expunged the adaptive dimension of rationality, which has been thus reduced 
to a static notion. Not by chance, it has been economists’ reductionism to bring the revolutionary 
nucleus of bounded rationality into line with the framework of classical rationality, seen as 
optimization under constraints (see, e.g., Conslik 1996; Rubinstein 1998). But the environment is a 
necessary requirement for bounded rationality because, as Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011, p. 457) 
point out, if one looks only at cognition, one is not able to understand when and why reasoning works 
or, alternatively, fails. In this regard, Callebaut (2007, p. 81) emphasizes that “[bounded rationality’s] 
significance turns not on absolute cognitive levels, but on the difference between cognitive resources 
and task demands”, that is, it turns on in terms of difference between cognitive abilities and 
environmental issues. This ‘difference’ engenders the adaptation process that is mostly visible when 
5 
 
individuals use ‘satisficing’7, rather than ‘optimizing’, criteria for making decisions. This focus on 
heuristic rules for judgment is probably the most significant and revolutionary aspect of Simon’s new 
paradigm. In accordance with this revolutionary nucleus, the emphasis on heuristics has been the 
hallmark of the most recent notions of rationality, as we are going to discuss in what follows. 
 
2.1 Heuristics and biases approach 
 
The research program in heuristics and biases, founded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 
the 1970s, has today gained such wide consensus in economics8, so as to earn Kahneman the Nobel 
Prize in 2002. This research program builds on the possibility of experimentally identifying a positive 
model of human behavior that violates some normative requirements of rationality; in particular, these 
normative requirements are based on the assumption that individuals are able to properly use formal 
logic and probability calculus (in particular Bayesian probability, see Oaksford and Chater 2007) in 
order to formulate correct judgments. In the heuristics and biases program, heuristics play a central 
role, in so far as people’s reliance on them for judgment is at the root of systematic and factual 
violations of rationality canons. Heuristics are therefore the main source of systematic errors (biases) 
in judgment formulation (Kahneman et al. 1982; Gilovich et al. 2002). Over decades, a large number 
of heuristics and cognitive biases has been experimentally identified (Kahneman 2003). In order to 
explain the cognitive dynamics related to the use of heuristics, Kahneman identifies two types of 
cognitive process (dual-system hypothesis): on the one hand, the so-called System 1 is fast, automatic, 
emotional and involves unconscious aspects; on the other hand, System 2 is slower, deliberate, 
analytical and relies on conscious evaluations. System 1’s imprinting over heuristics would explain 
in the end why humans make systematic errors in judgment (Evans and Frankish 2009; Kahneman 
2011). The ability to use intentional reasoning (based on System 2) in order to formulate correct 
judgments would emerge only after the automatic responses (System 1-based) are suppressed. The 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick 2005) has been developed accordingly as a measure of 
humans’ ability to suppress automatic responses in favor of intentional and conscious reasoning. In 
this perspective, the very nucleus of intelligence (conducive to rationality) would consist in the ability 
to control the dual-system dynamics. 
 
 
                                                          
7Satisficing is a neologism coined by Simon (1956), standing for the synthesis of the words satisfying and sufficing. 
8 This is mainly because the heuristic and biases approach is the theoretical foundation to behavioral economics (see 
Heukelom 2014). 
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2.2 Ecological rationality 
 
An alternative research program in economic rationality, definitely critical of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s heuristics and biases, is ecological rationality, developed by Gerd Gigerenzer and his 
research group. Gigerenzer explicitly claims that Kahneman’s view stems from an incautious exegesis 
of Simon’s work. In particular, Gigerenzer criticizes Kahneman for having embraced the wrong 
prevailing interpretation of bounded rationality as cognitive limitations in information processing 
(just one blade of the scissors), thus not paying any attention to the role of the environment. The 
ecological rationality research program is thus intended to restore Simon’s original idea that cognitive 
resources and environmental demands represent an analytical unit. 
Heuristics are, once again, the core of the analysis. Challenging the heuristics and biases approach, 
according to which heuristics are the source of judgment errors, ecological rationality looks at 
heuristics as fast and frugal rules able to reliably provide choice criteria in different situations. The 
main hypothesis of ecological rationality is in fact that each heuristic stems from an adaptive process 
to a specific environment (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011, p 456), and thus, accordingly, that 
heuristics allow comparatively better judgments (even with respect to the ‘rational’ rules of logic and 
probability calculus) when they are used in their own specific original environment (Gigerenzer and 
Brighton 2009). Heuristics under this point of view compose an adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer and 
Selten 2002), which is the resultant of evolutionary processes (Barkow et al. 1992) and provides 
humans with adequate tools for accomplishing specific tasks. 
Ecological rationality rejects the assumption that humans are ‘Bayesian statisticians’ – an assumption 
that would justify the use of normative standard of logic and probability for judgment assessment (as 
in Kahneman’s view) – and posits that judgment’s rationality can only be evaluated on the basis of 
which specific heuristics are chosen to accomplish specific tasks. Notice that ecological rationality 
does not reject the existence of errors in judgment: it simply posits that the source of errors does not 
lie in the cognitive limits of the subjects, but stems from the mismatch between heuristics and the 
environment in which they are used.  
The panorama described in the two sections above is that of ‘rationality wars’ between Kahneman 
and Gigerenzer (Samuels et al. 2004), whose intensity shows no sign of abating. The research 
program in embodied rationality that we introduce in what follows, is sympathetic with ecological 
rationality regarding the necessity of following Simon’s authentic view but, as we are going to 
discuss, it shall point out that ecological rationality is still decisively tied to a limit (if considered 
from today’s standpoint) of Simon’s framework: the ‘cognitivist’ view of cognition. Thus, embodied 
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cognition is meant to amend what is still unsatisfactory in the cognitive psychology foundations of 
ecological rationality9. 
 
3. Toward a theory of embodied rationality 
 
3.1 Cognitivism and rationality 
 
Technically, the ‘cognitivist heaven’ in which Simon placed bounded rationality is founded on the 
physical symbol system hypothesis, namely the idea that human cognition works through internal (i.e., 
mental) symbolic representations of the external environment processed by a centralized (i.e. in-
line10) analytical system (Newell and Simon 1976). Residua of these cognitivist foundations are 
usually taken for granted – when acknowledged – by economic rationality threads of research;  in this 
regard, we maintain that a significant shift in economic rationality can only pass through the explicit 
acknowledgment, questioning and overcoming of the residual cognitivist stances; in other words, this 
means following in rationality studies the same path followed by cognitive psychology in its 
progressive detachment from cognitivism (Haugeland 1978; Johnson 1997). Erkki Patokorpi (2008) 
has inaugurated this task, by acknowledging the so-called ‘Simon’s paradox’, that is, the fact that the 
‘bounds’ of human reason are represented through an ‘unbounded’ tool (i.e. the digital computer), 
and by identifying this heritage into contemporary rationality theories.  
The residual cognitivist foundations of current theories of rationality are evident in both the heuristics 
and biases and the ecological rationality research programs. As already mentioned, in the heuristics 
and biases approach heuristics are just mental phenomena, lacking any coupling with the 
environment; using the computer metaphor, somewhat foundational to the cognitivist paradigm, 
heuristics would be like bugged computer programs11. On the other hand, despite ecological 
rationality puts a decisive emphasis on the cognition-environment coupling, heuristics, conceived as 
formal rules for information processing, are implemented through ‘computer programs’, explicitly in 
the footsteps of Simon’s tradition (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).  
                                                          
9 A further and recent thread of research in rationality is that of grounded rationality (Elqayam and Evans 2011). 
Grounded rationality conceives rationality as a set of rules embedded in specific epistemic communities. In this 
perspective, rationality is at first a relative and descriptive notion that, once institutionalized in a community, acquires 
a normative status. 
10 This assumption has later been relaxed, for instance by models of parallel processing. 
11 Fiori (2011) states that the ‘dual-system’ foundation of heuristics and biases (see Section 2.1) represents a break with 
respect to Simon’s cognitivism. This interpretation is – according to us – not conclusive because Simon himself saw 
cognitivism as perfectly compatible with dual-system theories (see, e.g., Vera and Simon, 1993).  
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In the following sections, we shall discuss the ways in which the new point of view of embodied 
cognition can provide alternative foundations to the notion of bounded rationality. Two caveats are 
however in order here. Firstly, as we mentioned in the Introduction, embodied cognition is far from 
being a stable corpus of theories (see, e.g., Wilson 2002 that identifies ‘six views’ of embodied 
cognition). Due to this theoretical plurality, this essay does not focus on or embrace a specific view 
of embodied cognition, but rather brings out a number of new foundational possibilities. The second 
caveat is related to the fact that many topics that we discuss here may not sound so new to scholars 
accustomed to cognitive psychology. However, our assumption here is that there are good reasons to 
think that these topics might sound interesting to many scholars involved in economic psychology, 
making them worthy of being discussed here. 
 
3.2 An enriched environment 
 
In the next two subsections, we discuss two approaches within embodied cognition, respectively 
situated cognition and distributed cognition, important because they provide a new point of view on 
the role of environment in cognitive psychology. Our specific contribution here shall be to identify 
how these two points of view can help to rethink the notion of ‘decision-making environment’, so 
central in economic psychology. 
 
3.2.1 The limits of syntactic representationalism and the first/third-person distinction 
 
Distinctive evidence of the cognitivist heritage in contemporary investigations on rationality – as 
shown in particular by ecological rationality – lies in the notion of decision-making environment as 
expressed through the notion of structure of the task environment (see Simon 1956; Bullock and Todd 
1999). In particular, ecological rationality categorizes environments according to syntactic 
‘structural’ traits such as information redundancy, rarity, etc. (see Rieskamp and Dieckmann 2012; 
McKenzie and Chase 2012). This characterization tends to underestimate the role of the 
environments’ semantics: a playground or a battlefield might result in the same syntactic 
representation. In this framework then, the adequacy of heuristics to a particular environment is 
measured by the ecological correlations of syntactic structures between heuristics and environments 
(e.g. McKenzie and Chase 2012)12. A perspective that goes beyond the syntactic view of 
                                                          
12 We have to remark an important incongruence between the theoretical assumptions of ecological rationality and the 
actual framework through which these assumptions are implemented. A fundamental assumption of ecological 
rationality is that heuristics and environments are ‘content-specific’ and, as such, semantically characterized. But, this 
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environments replaces, at a first level of approximation, the structure of the task environment – in 
Simon’s or Gigerenzer’s understanding – with that of context, according to which the environment 
presents a markedly semantic dimension. This shift has already been accomplished by economists, 
especially behavioral economists, who claim the necessity of running experiments in semantic 
environments, very similar to real-life contexts (Loewenstein 1999). 
However, recent cognitive psychology claims that this ‘contextual turn’ is not enough. Situated 
cognition denies that the notion of ‘context’ is adequate to account for the phenomena of human 
cognition, and claims that it should be replaced by the more radical notion of ‘situation’ (see e.g. 
Rohlfing et al. 2003). In particular, while contexts are founded on the conflation between ‘first-
person’ and ‘third-person’ representations, that is, between subjective and objective descriptions of 
environments, situated cognition refuses this unwarranted conflation (Clancey 1993)13. The notion of 
situation builds on the centrality of action: action, and in particular inter-action between subjects and 
environments, makes first-person representations irreducible (basically because the outcome of a 
process of interaction is not pre-specifiable) (Greenberg 2001). The emphasis on the notion of 
interaction leads some researchers even to reject the ontological distinction between first and third 
person, and to propose a completely new ontological view in which the notion of interaction is 
autonomous14 (Agre 1993). 
The distinction between first and third person produces major implications for the conceptualization 
of the decision-making environment: there is no way to determine a priori which specific trait of the 
environment will be ‘salient’ for decisions. The attempt of amending the syntactic view of decision-
making environments just by adding more semantic content is therefore inadequate because it would 
lack the essential interactionist perspective. Real-world interactions cannot even be substituted by 
surrogate interactions, as conceived for instance in game theory and experimental economics, where 
interactions lack any material and ostensive dimension. Consider, for instance, how the notion of 
‘learning’ is framed in game theory (see, e.g., Fundenberg 1998).  
A radical alternative to the poorly semanticized and non-interactive rationality frameworks has been 
proposed by the research program in naturalistic decision making (Klein 2008). Naturalistic decision 
                                                          
semantic dimension is practically lost when heuristics and environments are respectively characterized as rules and 
stylized structures. 
13 This point was at the center of a debate in 1993 between Simon (with his colleague Alonso Vera) and situated 
cognition scholars. Vera and Simon argued that situated cognition’s arguments were not sufficient to legitimately claim 
for a re-foundation of cognitive psychology (see Petracca 2015). 
14 A perspective in which the ontology of relations outranks the one of subjects/environments can be found, for 
instance, in the ‘dynamic systems’ approach to cognition.  
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making rejects the idea that decision making can be ‘simulated’ at all: real-life decisions are therefore 
considered the only legitimate place to investigate into human rationality15. 
 
3.2.2 A 'distributed' and 'extended' reasoning 
 
Cognitivism’s footprint on current economic rationality is also visible in the persistent interpretation 
of the task environment as a set of constraints. In the ecological rationality interpretation, for instance, 
these constraints exert a selective pressure on heuristics, which in response adapt to them (Bullock 
and Todd, 1999). The cognitive psychology approach called distributed cognition rejects the idea of 
the environment as a mere set of constraints and proposes a radically different perspective, 
summarized by the words of Suchman that the “world's independence of [our] control is not an 
obstacle to be overcome but a resource to be made use of” (Suchman 1986, p. 13). In order to re-
define the role of the environment in cognition, cognitive psychology has had to contend, even 
linguistically, with the theoretical limits imposed by the dualism cognition/environment. An attempt 
to amend such limits lies in the notion of ‘extended mind’ (Clark and Chalmers 1998), which 
represents an attempt to blur the boundaries between what is cognition and what is environment. Both 
‘distributed cognition’ and ‘extended mind’, challenging the traditional understanding of 
environments, are meant to cast new light also on the reasoning process.  
The central idea is that environments in which humans act systematically provide the resources that 
can be employed in reasoning processes. Consider the so-called cognitive artifacts, that is, physical 
objects such as a calendar, a shopping list, a computer or even fingers, which are used to support and 
improve reasoning (Hutchins 1999, p. 126). Cognitive artifacts are mainly used to off-load the 
cognitive load on the environment, thereby making cognitive resources available for other purposes. 
But the environment is also used for cognitive purposes less trivial than mere off-loading, which 
involve the very act of ‘reasoning’. In this spirit, for instance, Kirsh and Maglio (1994) distinguish 
between pragmatic action and epistemic action: the former is devoted to a pragmatic purpose, i.e. to 
change an environment according to definite objectives, while the latter uses the environment for 
reasoning. Consider the game of Tetris, specifically studied by Kirsh and Maglio: to rotate figures is 
an action that players perform in order to facilitate the decision process of where to place figures. The 
rotation action – conceptually unnecessary for the purpose of the game – is an epistemic action that 
exploits the environment in order to make the decision process faster and more effective. Another 
                                                          
15 Ecological rationality has tried to integrate naturalistic decision making within its own theoretical framework. In fact, 
Todd and Gigerenzer (2001, p. 382) state that their objective is that of providing a ‘content-dependent’ framework to 
naturalistic decision making. In spite of their attempt, it seems that they have not fully acknowledged the first- and 
third- person distinction, implicit in naturalistic decision making. 
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way in which the environment can support reasoning is when material interactions provide otherwise 
unattainable insights. The value of this kind of environmental interaction was suggested, for instance, 
by the mathematician Pólya (1957), who recommended the heuristic use of pen and paper to facilitate 
mathematical reasoning (see also Zhang 1997). With explicit reference to inferential processes, 
Lorenzo Magnani introduces the notion of manipulative abduction (Magnani 2001). A fundamental 
role in abductive reasoning (i.e. that reasoning process oriented to formulate explanatory hypotheses 
of observed facts) is played by the so-called epistemic mediators (such as diagrams on sheets of paper, 
etc.) used for hypotheses discovering. Magnani distinguishes between ‘thinking about doing’ and 
‘thinking through doing’: in particular, the latter characterizes reasoning processes in which 
environmental interaction serves the purpose of providing information that would not be otherwise 
accessible to subjects. 
These arguments can arguably have a direct impact on economic psychology. They do not only imply 
conceptualizing the task environment as ‘resource’ rather than as ‘constraint’, as it would be natural 
(and right) to do.  Distributed cognition would also provide an altogether new point of view on the 
economic agent, which could be characterized more as a ‘chance seeker’ than as the usual 
‘information processor’ (Bardone 2011).  More concrete implications of distributed cognition and 
extended mind for economic psychology can be found at the methodological level. One, for instance, 
concerns the current practices of experimental economics. Excessive rigidity and standardization of 
experiments – claimed to be distinctive traits of experimental economics’ investigations (see Hertwig 
and Ortmann 2001) – triggers a sort of 'illusion of control' with respect to actual human behavior16. 
Further, the pervasive mediation of computer screens in experimental economics laboratories, in 
particular when used to study human interactions, leads us to another consideration. As stressed by 
Oullier and Basso (2010), an essential component of the interaction among humans relies on the 
materiality of the interaction. Information conveyed through the body (i.e., through the so-called 
‘body language’) is invaluable to the extent it could not emerge saliently otherwise.  
Acknowledging that human-to-human is a specific form of human-to-environment interaction – in 
fact, as McDermott said, “we are environment to each other” (quoted in Suchman 1987, p. 47) – 
implies a wider understanding of ‘distributedness’ (Hutchins 2006). The pioneer of this wider 
‘distributed’ perspective in economics is Hayek (1948). Clark and Chalmers (1998, chapter 9) 
introduced the concept of ‘scaffold’ to express how distributed and interactive mechanisms lead to 
establish supra-individual structures, such as routine and formal and informal rules, able to steer 
individuals’ social action  (see also Denzau and North 1994). 
                                                          
16 It is interesting to recall, on this point, the anecdote reported by Daniel Dennett concerning a child who, not allowed 
to use fingers for calculations, used tongue and teeth as substitutes (Dennett 1995). 
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3.3 Rationality and body correlates 
 
3.3.1 Reasoning as simulation and the role of embodied metaphors 
 
The notion of ‘procedural rationality’ – one of Simon’s main intellectual achievements17 – is 
fundamentally linked to a ‘pragmatic’ interpretation of rationality (Harman 1993). In his early work 
on administrative behavior, Simon (1947) in fact understood rationality as means-ends chains, where 
the core of rationality consisted in evaluating means’ adequacy to reach pre-specified ends18. The 
human cognitive faculties of imagining, planning, predicting things or events that are alien to the 
current situation (i.e. outside the strict phenomenological dimension of ‘here and now’) are thus 
necessary cognitive requirements for the notion of procedural/pragmatic rationality. Beyond 
emphasizing the importance of contingent cognition (on-line cognition), the foundational perspective 
of embodied cognition is able to shed new light also on non-contingent cognition (off-line cognition) 
(Wilson 2008)19.  In what follows, we shall consider what embodied cognition is able to say on off-
line reasoning in economic rationality. 
The cognitive phenomenon of simulation, which concerns the exploitation of the sensory-motor 
system for understanding and reasoning (Jeannerod 2001; Hesslow 2002; Gallese and Lakoff 2005), 
has been identified as the main mechanism at the root of off-line reasoning (Barsalou 2008; Goldman 
and de Vignemont 2009). Simulation assumes a central role in contemporary embodied theories 
because it constitutes the fundamental mechanism through which ‘mental representations’ and their 
‘manipulations’ (indeed very controversial notions in cognitive psychology) work20. Among the 
different types of emphasis on the role of modal21 dimension in simulation (see Meteyard and 
Vigliocco 2008), the most radical embodied cognition approach – also known as ‘strong embodiment’ 
                                                          
17 Simon (1976) distinguished between ‘substantive’ rationality, where rationality concerns the outcome of choice, and 
‘procedural’ rationality, where rationality concerns the process of choice. Procedural rationality, in the case for instance 
of consumers’ choice, focuses on how consumers choose and not on what they choose.  
18 Russell and Norvig (1994) import this definition of rationality in the AI framework.   
19 While opponents of embodied cognition typically reduce it to a theory of on-line cognition, Wilson claims that offline 
cognition is embodied cognition’s true testbed (Wilson 2008, p. 330). 
20 Whether the supporters of situated cognition underestimate the role of mental representations (in fact 
representations are almost unessential in their framework), the supporters of the ‘simulation’ view try to explain the 
very nature of those representations. This distinction is revealing of the theoretical plurality underlying embodied 
cognition. 
21 Modal is a representation codified using the sensory-motor system. Conversely, a-modality pertains to 
representations’ independence from the sensory-motor system. 
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–  claims that anything necessary to create and manipulate representations is embodied in the sensory-
motor system, and thus it can be identified in terms of body correlates. An example of simulative 
approach to reasoning is Lakoff and Johnson (1999)’s attempt to explain inferential processes through 
the mechanism of inference-preserving-cross-domains mappings, according to which one projects 
the inferential structure of an original domain to a target domain, usually more abstract. For example, 
if we say “she is a cold person”, the concept of ‘cold’ (source domain) will be mapped into ‘lack of 
affection’ (target domain) (Núñez 2008, p. 337). Therefore the notion of ‘cold’, which evokes a body 
dimension, provides the foundations for creating the notion of ‘lack of affection’, instantiated through 
a metaphorical process22. In this perspective, the morphological traits of the human body play the role 
of non-arbitrary constraints to the human capability of making abstractions and inferences. 
The importance of the framework of embodied cognition to economics can in particular be 
appreciated when there is an overlapping of topics between disciplines, as is the case with the topic 
of ‘ownership’. Beyond the many ‘economic’ explanations, ownership has been explained in the 
embodied cognition framework by emphasizing the determinants of contact and proximity to the 
owned object (see, for example, Tummolini et al. 2013). By juxtaposing the studies on embodied 
ownership on the one hand, and ownership-related economic phenomena – such as the endowment 
effect (Kahneman et al. 1991) – on the other hand, answers to many puzzles (Plott and Zeiler 2005) 
might easily be found. Further on ownership, embodied metaphors play a crucial role. In a recent 
study, Florack et al. (2014) shows that the physical act of hand washing – one of the most popular 
embodied metaphors – decreases the endowment effect.  
 
3.3.2 Body correlates and dual-system dynamics 
 
The human body as the ultimate new foundation of cognitive processes and, in turn, of reasoning 
processes, can also be central in understanding dual-system dynamics in economic judgment (see, 
e.g., Kahneman 2011). In a recent article, Mastrogiorgio and Petracca (2014)23 investigate the body 
determinants of automatic/deliberative reasoning in numerical tasks. They argue that the activation 
of automatic responses (System 1) is closely dependent on the use of specific numerals (and not 
‘numbers’ as magnitudes). The idea is that, within a given numeral system, such as the common 10-
based Arabic system, some numerals (e.g., 1, 2, 5, 10, 100,…) are handled in a faster and more 
                                                          
22 Notice that the metaphor of ‘scissors’ itself, used to define bounded rationality, is based on this logic. 
23 See also Mastrogiorgio (2015) for further remarks. 
14 
 
automatic way if compared with other numerals of the same system24. The literature on mathematical 
cognition (see Cohen Kadosh and Walsh 2009) shows that the automatic use of specific numerals in 
numeral systems is dependent by the underlying counting systems. For instance, the 10-based Arabic 
system relies on the computation method based on the fingers of both hands (see Gibbs 2006). This 
example suggests that the identification of body correlates underlying automatic behavior in different 
decision domains can be of fundamental importance to a theory of economic reasoning. 
 
3.4 The body as pivot of the scissors 
 
If the goal that inspires modern rationality studies in economics is the identification of “invariants of 
human behavior” (as suggested by Simon 1990), then one should suddenly acknowledge that a true 
invariant in human behavior is the human body. However, Simon’s scissors metaphor constitutively 
rules out the human body, considered as a sort of cumbersome presence. It is somehow ironic that the 
human body is however right there, both in Kahneman’s and Gigerenzer’s theories, just because they 
place so great emphasis on heuristics: a synonym for ‘heuristic’ is in fact – and of course not by 
chance – ‘rule of thumb’. The metaphor of the scissors is, once more somehow ironically, perfectly 
suited for considering the role of body as theoretical locus of connection between cognition and 
environment: as we discussed above, the two blades have cutting power only in combination, that is 
to say, the two blades can cut only if there is a pivot that holds them together. This pivot is the human 
body, which constitutes a material interface between cognition and environment. 
It is important to emphasize that in this new perspective the body is a necessary theoretical locus for 
a theory of rationality, and so that it needs to be more than simply ‘taken into account'. Many 
experimental studies already take into account body variables (e.g. temperature, blood pressure, etc.) 
that affect choices, decisions and judgments. What those experiments lack is however the attribution 
of a deeper theoretical status to the human body for a theory of human rationality. This is, however, 
a situation that is goingto be amended (Spellman and Schnall 2009; Reimann et al. 2012; 
Mastrogiorgio and Petracca 2015).  
 
3.4.1 Policy implications 
 
                                                          
24 Wulf Albers (2001), within the ecological rationality framework, models heuristic calculation by means of the so-
called ‘prominent numbers’ (i.e., numerals 1, 2, 5, 10 …) in the decimal system. Albers does not however explain why 
some numerals are processed faster and easier than others. 
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Some brief consideration, as economists who want to speak mainly to economists, has to be proposed 
concerning the implications of embodied cognition for policy making. In recent years, research has 
focused primarily on nudging, that is, the idea of designing environments so as to drive individuals’ 
choice toward socially desired outcomes, without modifying the structure of economic incentives and 
maintaining the freedom of choice (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The notion of architecture of choice 
refers in particular to the way in which options are presented, in order to encourage socially-desired 
choices. Experiments on nudging are typically run in real-world contexts, and place a decisive 
emphasis on the embodied substratum of the architecture of choice. An example of typical nudging 
advice would be to place healthy foods at ‘eye level’ in a self-service restaurant, so as to make them 
comparatively more chosen (Thorndike et al. 2012). In this regard, in a domain that is already 
implicitly ‘embodied’, explicitly considering the point of view of embodied cognition can be 
important in at least two directions: i) theoretically, so as to identify the body as a conceptual locus 
for nudging; ii) operatively, shaping environments in order to enhance their ergonomics. Ergonomics 
is the keyword here: all the environments of choice are ostensive at the human-body scale. Thus, an 
important objective of embodied rationality is to foster a programmatic link between the disciplines 
of ergonomics and economics (see also Hendricks 1996). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This essay has focused, on the one hand, on the identification of those traits, distinctly cognitivist, 
characterizing Simon’s legacy in current studies on economic rationality; on the other hand, it has 
proposed new hypotheses to reform those traits in the light of the more recent advancements in 
cognitive psychology. The starting point of our analysis has been the crucial notion of bounded 
rationality. As one of the most influential cognitive psychologists, Andy Clark, put it: “we should 
however distinguish the conception of reason as embodied and embedded from the important but still 
insufficiently radical notion of ‘bounded rationality” (Clark 1997, p. 243, n. 4). This essay has 
accordingly attempted the ‘radicalization’ of bounded rationality in the light of the multiple directions 
suggested by the fertile and varied field of study of embodied cognition. There is much work to do 
but, for the moment, it has just been important to remark the existence of a plurality of roads. 
It is useful to provide a brief summary of the specific ways embodied cognition might reform the 
notion of bounded rationality, as they have been discussed in this paper. They can be condensed in a 
few stylized programmatic points: 
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- reasoning is situated, that is, interaction is the fundamental way in which reasoning takes 
place: thus, it is necessary to distinguish between first-person and third-person representations 
of  decision environments. 
- reasoning is not exclusively a mental phenomenon as humans constitutively use the resources 
provided by the environment in order to reason; this also means that the environment should 
be conceptualized as a resource rather than as a constraint; 
- off-line reasoning works through simulations that exploit the resources provided by the 
sensory-motor system, so that sensory-motor experience provides the building blocks of 
abstraction;  
- automatic thinking stems often from the (evolutionary) coupling between some morphological 
traits of the human body and the environment they were originally fitted to. 
 
We hope these programmatic points to be at the center of future research under the label of embodied 
rationality (see Spellman and Schnall 2009; Mastrogiorgio and Petracca 2015). 
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